NATO
NATO entered the Contract Zone as a ragtag group of survivors from the remnants of the NATO alliance. Individual operators converged under the NATO banner not because of the strength of the alliance they once represented, but because survival demanded it.
Fighting was what they knew. Fighting was how they ate.
The Contract offered NATO an opportunity to elevate its wealth and status while securing the resources necessary to survive.
- Captured and controlled the city with RUSFOR support
- Successfully negotiated an alliance with RUSFOR
- Successfully negotiated with local townspeople
- Completed the required compound preparation process
- Recovered 26 enemy Life Coins
- Captured significant enemy cash and food resources
- Poor opening intelligence collection and reporting
- Operators became fixed around prolonged firefights
- Failed to secure required fuel containers
- Failed to secure the final detonation location
- Unable to deliver the completed compound package
NATO began the operation with a high troop count but entered the battlefield from a precarious infiltration position. Early contact with RUSFOR developed into a prolonged firefight that consumed personnel and attention.
Rather than disengaging and distributing teams across the battlefield, NATO operators became concentrated around the engagement. The result was a major failure in intelligence collection.
NATO performed considerably better during engineering operations. The faction recovered key components, completed the required engineering processes, and successfully manufactured the final compound.
NATO successfully completed the compound manufacturing process but failed to convert that technical success into completion of the final objective.
The faction suffered a critical delay locating a vital engineering component and did not preemptively secure the required delivery and detonation location.
NATO demonstrated significant combat capability, strong resource capture, successful diplomacy, effective negotiation with local townspeople, strong capture-and-control performance, and complete execution of the compound mixture procedure.
Its principal weakness throughout the operation was organization and communication.
The faction repeatedly allowed direct battlefield contact to consume personnel and attention that should have been directed toward mission objectives.
The final engineering process was executed correctly. The compound was successfully prepared. However, NATO failed to secure the necessary fuel containers, failed to control the detonation location, and was unable to deliver its completed package.
NATO entered the Contract Zone capable of winning individual fights. They left having demonstrated that winning the fight and completing the Contract were not always the same thing.